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Abstract 
The growth of Internet-connected devices, Internet-enabled services and Internet of Things systems continues at a rapid pace, 
and their application to transport systems is heralded as game-changing.  Numerous developing CAV (Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicle) functions, such as traffic planning, optimisation, management, safety-critical and cooperative 
autonomous driving applications, rely on data from various sources. The efficacy of these functions is highly dependent on the 
dimensionality, amount and accuracy of the data being shared. It holds, in general, that the greater the amount of data 
available, the greater the efficacy of the function. However, much of this data is privacy-sensitive, including personal, 
commercial and research data. Location data and its correlation with identity and temporal data can help infer other personal 
information, such as home/work locations, age, job, behavioural features, habits, social relationships. This work categorises 
the emerging privacy challenges and solutions for CAV systems and identifies the knowledge gap for future research, which 
will minimise and mitigate privacy concerns without hampering the efficacy of the functions. 
1 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is promising revolutionary 
changes in the way people live, work, transport, and interact 
with technology by bringing together multiple sensors, 
actuators, communications technologies, data and processing. 
One of the significant areas of IoT development is in the area 
of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) [1]. ITSs consist of 
a network of roadside units (RSU), vehicular on-board 
electronic control units (ECU), distributed computing and 
storage systems [2]. Wireless networks communications such 
as V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle), and V2I (Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure) are enabled through technologies such as 
IEEE 802.11p DSRC/WAVE (Dedicated Short Range 
Communication/Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments) 
and cellular advances such as C-V2X [3]. 
 
Modern vehicles are evolving to be safer, more energy 
efficient, more comfortable and accessible by being equipped 
with a wide range of sensors and ECUs. Developments in 
wireless communication, sensing the internal and external 
surroundings, and capability of decision taking for driving are 
advancing the state of the art in connected and autonomous 
vehicles (CAVs). To help categorise the level of autonomy in 
CAVs, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has 
created a set of standardised levels for autonomy from level 0 
to 5, wherein at level 5 the vehicle is expected to take all 
driving decisions without any user monitoring required [4]. 
Further to the autonomy advances, the development of 
reliable low latency wireless communications (i.e. the 
envisioned 5G), and cloud-based infrastructure are able to 
coordinate and increase the knowledge-base of CAVs. Cloud-
assisted CAVs bring advantages such as broader connectivity 
for real-time traffic optimisation realised through the cloud 
and mobile edge computing [5]. 
 
As well as promising numerous benefits, CAVs also the 
potential for negative consequences such as privacy invasions 
and tracking [6]. While we mention privacy invasions, it is 
important to recognise that there is not a unified definition of 
privacy.  Indeed, there have been propositions that there is a 
paradox [7], and that privacy varies according to different 
people, communities, and cultures [8].  From a business 
perspective, privacy compromises might negatively influence 
the reputation of manufacturers and businesses. Therefore, 
privacy protection is an essential aspect of consumer trust, 
and hence the adoption of new technology [9], [10]. 
Approaches to protect privacy can be termed Privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) and they can promise 
significant advances in data sharing to drive all kinds of 
applications forward with confidence.  
 
Privacy challenges in CAV systems are can be analysed 
considering identity anonymisation and authentication in 
vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) by using schemes such 
as pseudonym-based privacy and group signatures. Recently, 
Qu et al. addressed and classified privacy challenges and 
requirements for vehicular networks [11]. However, privacy 
challenges that might arise out of the CAV functions (e.g. 
location-based services, etc.) have not been included. If there 
is a known link between two points of data, anything learned 
by one of the points might enable to make an inference about 
the other data point. Asuquo et al. analysed the privacy 
requirements, challenges and approaches Location-Based 
Services (LBS) in vehicular networks [12]. Ni et al. analysed 
the privacy requirements of fog-computing based vehicular 
systems and their functions [13]. To the best of our 
knowledge, this work is the first review, which delivers a 
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comprehensive analysis of the privacy challenges of both 
vehicular networks and CAV functions. It proposes a novel 
taxonomy and discussed the identified state-of-the-art in 
Differential Privacy (a particular type of PET that is 
attracting significant attention) regarding its applicability to 
the privacy challenges in CAV functions we have identified. 
This work also identifies the existing knowledge gap in the 
research base and proposes emerging research directions. 
 
2 Methodology 
In this work, we provide a brief background for existing 
notions of privacy and characteristics of CAVs. We then 
present the privacy challenges and privacy-preserving 
techniques, which have been identified through a semi-
systematic review and qualitative analysis.  We consider 
research published between 1998, the year Latanya 
Sweeney’s seminal work on  k-anonymity [14] was 
published, and 2018. Finally, we discussed the potential 
applicability of the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving 
approaches for the privacy challenges and in CAV systems. 
2.1 Paper Review Protocol 
The following table summarises the paper review protocol 
employed in this study, aimed at reducing the potential risk 
of selection bias.  
 
Table 1 Paper review protocol 
Criteria Description 
Timeframe Between 1998 and 2018  
Language English 
Aims  To identify privacy challenges 
in ITS and CAV functions. 
 To establish the state-of-the-
art PETs and evaluate their 
potential on the application 
domain. 
Topic “Privacy Preserving Techniques”, 
“Vehicular Communication”, 
“Intelligent Transportation 
Systems”, “Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicles” 
Type Academic Journals, Peer Reviewed 
Conference Proceedings 
Search Technique Boolean and word combinations 
Keywords Privacy preserving, Intelligent 
Transportation Systems, Connected 
and Autonomous Vehicles, 
Differential Privacy. 
Databases IEEE Xplore, Science Direct, ACM 
Digital Library, Google Scholar. 
Include The highly cited papers and the 
recent 3 years` papers are 
prioritised. 
 
3 Notions of Privacy 
The concept of privacy is not new, but it is elusive. In the 
early stages, privacy was firmly aligned with secrecy, as the 
Code of Hammurabi has brought the protection of the house 
of every Ancient Babylonian against others` intrusion. In the 
1800s, privacy was defined as the “right to be let alone” [15]. 
The definition has been expanded and developed as human`s 
needs changed over time. It has been defined as an “umbrella 
term” which refers to the group of wide and distinct elements 
[16], containing “bodily, communications, territorial, and 
informational” elements under the umbrella. Bodily privacy 
is the physical protection of individuals and is profoundly 
linked to safety. Privacy of communications represents the 
confidentially of the information transmitted via any 
communication channel. Territorial privacy is controlling the 
intrusion into personal territories such as the home, 
workplace, vehicle and public spaces. Informational privacy 
indicates personal data aggregated by organisations and 
companies [17]. Today, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights currently preserves it as one of the legal 
and human rights in many nations since 1966. 
 
Privacy concerns change with the rapid advancement of 
technology such as the increased opportunity for data 
collection, storage and computation. Dwork noted that 
privacy could be disclosed when a link is established between 
different data points of the same data owners [18]. The ideal 
privacy for the information systems is defined as “nothing 
about an individual should be learned by an adversary from 
the database that cannot be learned without access to the 
database” [19]. Although it is not entirely achievable, it 
stands as a utopic goal of privacy mechanisms.  
 
The recent EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
has asserted that privacy should be taken into account from 
the early stage of system development rather than 
implementing privacy protection mechanisms later. The term 
“Privacy by Design”, has been coined to describe this 
principle [20]. One recent survey state that the understanding 
of privacy is changing for different people, communities and 
cultures, which that this should considered when developing 
privacy mechanisms [21]. 
 
Privacy, as a notion, has been evolving differently from the 
normative and technical points of view. Westin defined 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others.” [22]. 
Our privacy consideration is based on this definition. CAV 
users need to share the data about themselves to be able to 
make maximum use of advanced cooperative autonomous 
driving functions. In general, increasing the privacy of data 
comes, in general, as a cost in terms of sacrificing some of 
the advantages accruing from the functions.  However, it is 
an open research direction as to what the optimal balance of 
privacy versus function efficacy should be.  
 
4 Characteristics of CAVs 
VANETs have highly dynamic network structures, 
comprising wireless communication technologies between 
RSUs installed along roads, and the On-Board Units (OBUs) 
installed in vehicles [2]. The communication can be 
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established either V2V and V2I [23]. VANETs have evolved 
to into ITSs through the increased connectivity and reliable 
infrastructure services, which can be also supported by cloud 
services [24]. ITSs have dynamic, heterogeneous, distributed 
and open nature, leading to have distinctive features and 
specific requirements. The ITS features and security 
requirements are represented on the following Table 2 and 
Table 3 (adapted from [25]). 
 
Vehicles are evolving to become CAVs through being 
equipped with a wide range of sensors (e.g. Internal and 
External Cameras, Lidar, Radar, Ultrasound Sensors, GPS, 
etc.) and hundreds of ECUs [26]. CAVs generate a massive 
amount of rich-dimensionality data, which is utilised by a 
variety of functions and shared with other applications. This 
results in a need for ensuring privacy protection for CAV 
users, regarding data, identity and location privacy.  It should 
be noted that these functions may not only contain personal 
sensitive data but also commercial and research sensitive 
data.   
 
Table 2 ITS Features [25] 
Features Description 
Powerful capacity It includes powerful units in 
terms of energy resource, 
localisation, computation, 
storage and data rate capabilities. 
High mobility 
 
It includes many mobile units 
with different speed and 
direction. 
Dynamic network 
topology 
The units can join and/or leave 
the network very quickly 
depending on their location and 
speed. 
Time sensitivity The latency is one of the most 
important limitations (e.g. 100ms 
delay for safety-related 
messages). 
Sufficient energy The unit has sufficient resource 
in terms of energy, storage and 
computation for implementation 
of complex algorithms. 
Good physical 
protection 
Each unit needs protection 
against physical attacks. 
Unbounded network 
size 
It is not bounded with a special 
area. 
Wireless 
communications 
The units have wireless comm. 
among each other. 
Heterogeneous V2X 
communication 
Vehicles use a wide range of 
communications technologies 
Heterogeneous 
environments 
Vehicles can operate in different 
environments. 
Security and privacy It needs security and privacy 
mechanisms considering the time 
constraint and the low 
computation complexity. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 ITS Security Requirements [25] 
Requirements Description 
Authentication It is being able to verify data 
sources and destinations 
Data integrity It is being able to verify and 
validate the received data is not 
maliciously altered. 
Privacy and 
anonymity 
The users and vehicles should 
not be able to identify or tracked 
by the exchanged messages. 
Availability The units should be available for 
real-time applications. 
Traceability and 
revocation 
The authorities should be able to 
detect malicious entities and 
verify their identities. 
Authorisation ITS should be able to control 
access for the messages or 
enabled functions. 
Non-repudiation ITS units should be able to 
associate with their messages and 
actions. 
Robustness ITS should provide robust safety 
against cyber-attacks.  
Confidentiality The transmitted data should be 
protected from malicious or 
unauthorised entities.  
 
5 Privacy Challenges 
As mentioned, CAVs create challenges in cybersecurity nd 
privacy, and there exist a number of research proposals for 
reducing the likelihood of cyber-attacks against CAVs. From 
the cyber security point of view, the importance of privacy 
protection is to reduce the potential information loss and 
reputation loss due to cyber-attacks. Users` privacy should 
also be protected from potential disclosures by service 
providers, governmental agencies and third-party entities. 
This section presents the privacy challenges of CAV systems. 
The privacy challenges both arising from participating in ITS 
and CAV functions are analysed through three subclasses: 
Data Privacy, Identity Privacy and Location Privacy. 
 
In the following, we will discuss the privacy challenges 
present due to the inter-vehicular communication involved in 
ITS. The vehicles can be identified and tracked by messages 
propagated through the ITS. Usually messages are required to 
contain Vehicle ID or an appropriate pseudonym for 
authentication. Furthermore, it is standard that vehicles 
regularly broadcast safety awareness messages including 
location and direction. These messages can be eavesdropped 
to reveal vehicle identities or track vehicles. The privacy 
challenges in ITS are usually regarding identity and location 
but it is also required to ensure access of public authorities to 
identify and location information for accountability purposes 
[27].  
 
ITSs involve different type of vehicles and different level of 
autonomies. The privacy challenges in ITS influences all of 
the vehicles, however, there are additional privacy challenges 
regarding the functions of CAVs, such as traffic planning, 
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optimisation, safety and cooperative autonomous applications 
(e.g. platooning). CAVs rely on data from various sources 
(e.g., on-board sensors, other vehicles, infrastructure, etc.) 
while much of this data is privacy-sensitive including 
personal (e.g. geo-locations, number plates, identity 
information, biometrics, etc.), commercial (e.g. trucks’ loads, 
origin, destination information, etc.) and research (e.g. 
telemetry, test data, etc.). The share of this data might cause a 
privacy leakage of individuals or groups. 
 
People might encounter many privacy challenges during the 
use of CAVs. However, some of these challenges are not 
specific to CAVs, but rather they are about being in a public 
place or in a taxi such as the privacy challenges due to 
vehicular external/internal cameras. In the following, we will 
discuss the perceived privacy challenges presents specifically 
due to the use of CAV functions. The open question here is 
that: what is the required dimensionality and accuracy of the 
data to provide sufficient efficacy of the functions, without 
significantly compromising privacy. 
5.1 Route Planning 
CAVs are able to offload the navigation routes to the cloud-
based infrastructure in order to optimise the routes using real-
time road information. This presents a location privacy 
challenge since the user needs to reveal information about the 
start and the end locations of travel and it is highly likely that 
one of these is the user`s home or workplace. 
5.2 Participating in a Vehicle Platoon 
The examples of cooperative movement exist in nature such 
as a group of migratory birds fly together in a sequential 
manner, and a group of dolphins swim together. The 
cooperative movement is beneficial for them regarding 
energy consumption, comfort and safety. Similar benefits 
exist for cooperative vehicles as well, such as using actual 
road infrastructure more efficiently, lowering energy demand 
by reducing aerodynamic drag for following vehicles, and 
improving comfort and safety [28]. A group of vehicles 
moving in a sequence with a minimal inter-vehicle distance is 
named a vehicle platoon.  
 
In order to participate in a platoon, vehicles need to share 
several types of data (e.g. velocity, acceleration, destination, 
vehicle type and current location), depending on the 
optimisation objective of the platoon that the platoon 
management algorithms aims to maximise or minimise. From 
the literature review, it has been observed that most of the 
platoon management algorithms require receiving 
participating vehicles` destinations. The location is probably 
the most privacy-sensitive data. However, vehicle weight, 
required for the computation of maximal velocity and inter-
vehicle distance, might be considered privacy-sensitive since 
it might reveal knowledge about the number of people in a 
car or the amount of load in a truck. Additionally, the 
correlation between origin-destination and truck weight has 
the potential to reveal commercially sensitive knowledge. 
Therefore, these applications present data privacy and 
location privacy challenges.  However, the privacy challenges 
arising from participating in a platoon have not been widely 
discussed in the literature though designing platooning 
algorithms is receiving a great deal of attention. Amoozadeh 
et al. [29] discussed the privacy-preserving factor regarding 
the selection of platoon coordination strategy and decided to 
use the centralised approach since it would be fast, scalable 
and enhance privacy in some degree since the leader 
coordinates all communication, and only the platoon leader 
knows all configuration. The platoon configuration is only 
shared with the new leader when the old leader leaves. 
Clearly this approach is privacy-aware, though does not fully 
address all of the challenges. 
5.3 HD/3D Map Updates 
Many CAV functions are supported by a HD/3D Map, that 
provides information about the road and environmental 
conditions before they are detection by a vehicles on-board 
sensors. For instance, if an accident has happened on the 
road, the HD/3D Map can inform the vehicular navigation 
system to use alternative routes [30]. The integrity of the 
updates is vital. The updates will shape the map, and they 
should be credible and verifiable. However, the updates can 
also reveal the location and temporal data of the issuer CAV 
as well. This presents identity privacy and location privacy 
challenges.  
5.4 Vehicular Telemetry and Biometric Data 
Collection 
CAVs are equipped with sophisticated sensors to collect 
continuous data about the surrounding environment and the 
user. Analysing this sensory data can be used in fault 
detection [31], driving monitoring [32], and driver 
monitoring [33]. The biometric data of users can reveal 
information about personal health conditions [34]; likewise, 
telemetric data of trucks can reveal commercially sensitive 
information.  
 
Vehicular telemetric data is highly valuable for many parties. 
From the perspective of users, it can help developing more 
safe, secure and comfortable vehicles and services. From the 
traffic authorities and governments` perspective, it can allow 
optimising the use of infrastructure. From the OEMs` 
perspective, it can be analysed to develop new products and 
services. According to McKinsey`s Monetizing Car Data 
report, the overall revenue of vehicle-generated data market 
might reach 450 - 750 billion USD by 2030 [35]. Although 
the data can be anonymised before using it, the de-
anonymisation can be accomplished by cross-referencing 
[36]. Therefore, de-anonymised data might cause to identify, 
track and reveal some other private information of some 
users. The privacy challenges here can be associated with 
identity, location and data privacy. 
 
6  Privacy-Preserving Approaches 
Developing privacy-preserving approaches has gained 
significant attention in a variety of application domains. This 
section examines recent privacy-preserving approaches, 
which can be applied to CAV systems, and classifies them 
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into three categories: 1) Privacy Based on Anonymity, 2) 
Privacy Based on Perturbation, and 3) Privacy Based on 
Cryptography. 
6.1 Privacy Based on Anonymity 
In the generic structure, the data can be classified into 
attributes such as explicit-identifier, quasi-identifier, sensitive 
attributes, and non-sensitive attributes.  The explicit-identifier 
set is information directly concerning identification, such as 
names, IDs or number plates. The quasi-identifier set is 
information that might potentially disclose the data owner. 
Sensitive attributes are private information related to the data 
owner, and non-sensitive attributes are all of the rest 
information including public information [37]. The vehicles 
are usually linked to their users or the owner companies (e.g. 
commercial goods carriage). Therefore, the users or the 
companies can be considered as the data owner of the 
vehicular data. It was originally thought that privacy 
preservation could be achieved by anonymising the data. 
However it has been proved, the exclusively anonymising the 
attributes is not a robust method of preserving privacy. The 
combination of non-sensitive attributes might disclose private 
information of the data owner [36]. Traditionally 
anonymisation is performed by a centralised and trusted 
system that does not attempt to identify the individuals or 
disclose sensitive information. However, it cannot be 
guaranteed which is generally defined as honest-but-curious 
cloud server in the literature. 
 
One of the most well-known techniques is k-anonymity. It 
states that if a data entry in 𝑘 data entries cannot be identified 
from the rest of the 𝑘 − 1 data entries, the dataset has k-
anonymity [14]. In this method, an adversary can distinguish 
an individual with the maximum probability of 1/𝑘. The 
limitations of k-anonymity have been addressed, and the l-
diversity method was developed as an extension [38] 
followed by t-closeness [39]. 
6.2 Privacy Based on Perturbation 
Differential Privacy (DP) techniques are used to protect 
privacy by perturbing original data with a random noise while 
ensuring that the amount of distortion has little effect on the 
output. The primary purpose of DP is eliminating the change 
in the query outputs by the addition or removal of a single 
entry to the dataset. In the worst case, an adversary might 
have the background knowledge about all the data items 
except a single item that belongs to an individual. The query 
answers might help to disclose the data item. However, DP 
introduces uncertainty to the query answers. In this case, DP 
provides a privacy guarantee that the individual`s sensitive 
information will be not disclosed. In other words, it resolves 
the risk privacy disclosure by participating in a dataset for 
individuals [18]. According to Chen et al., DP is the state-of-
the-art privacy notion, which provides provable privacy 
guarantee independent from an adversary’s background 
knowledge and computational power [40]. 
 
Let 𝐷1 be the dataset as being the collection of 𝑛 entries from 
a universe 𝑆. Let the other dataset, 𝐷2 to be a neighbouring 
dataset of 𝐷1 (i.e. consists of same entries except differing 
only one entry), ‖𝐷1 − 𝐷2‖1 ≤1. The definition of DP is for 
the given neighbouring datasets 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 is that; a 
randomised mechanism 𝑀 provides (ϵ,δ)-DP if the datasets 
𝐷1and 𝐷1 are neighbouring datasets while all 𝑆 ∈
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝑀), 
 
Pr[𝑀(𝐷1) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ 𝑒
𝜖 × Pr[𝑀(𝐷2) ∈ 𝑆] + δ 
 
The ratio of the two probability equations is bounded by 
𝑒𝜖. The 𝜖 is the privacy budget (denotation of the privacy 
loss) and the higher the value, implies providing less privacy 
guarantee. The probability of 𝛿 is the limitation of privacy 
violation and negligible in many settings. When the 𝛿 is 
equal to 1, the privacy guarantee is completely removed. 
When 𝛿 = 0, the randomised mechanism ensures 𝜖-DP 
which is the strictest privacy protection from the definition 
and generally called pure DP. On the other hand, When 𝛿 >
0, it is called approximate DP [41].  
 
The sensitivity is the parameter of a dataset for determining 
how much perturbation is required in the randomised 
mechanisms. If 𝑓 is a query in dataset 𝐷1 then the amount of 
perturbation in the output is calibrated with 𝑓(𝐷1). Sensitivity 
is also depends on the type of the query 𝑓. The global 
sensitivity is used for count and sum queries, however, it 
returns high values for the queries like median and average. 
The local sensitivity is used for such queries. 
 
DP has recently emerged as the gold standard of data privacy 
since it is not tied up with the background information of 
adversary and computation power.  It does, however, 
introduce a trade-off between data utility and privacy. CAVs 
are highly mobile, resource constrained and time-bound and 
the functions should run accurately not to jeopardise the 
safety of users. For these reasons, implementing DP in the 
vehicular domain has challenges. We divided the use of DP 
into three classes, namely VANET, OEMs data, and CAV 
functions, and present a classification of current research in 
Table 4. 
  
Table 4 Differential Privacy Studies in Vehicular Domain 
Class Ref. Year Privacy 
Mechanism 
Outcome 
VANET [42] 2018 Machine 
learning 
based 
collaborative 
intrusion 
detection 
system  
 
Used DP 
with dual 
variable 
perturbation. 
Investigated 
the security 
privacy 
trade-off.  
[43] 2018 DP for 
publishing 
mobility data 
for 
transportation 
applications. 
Proposed 
Constraint- 
Based DP 
and 
evaluated its 
performance.  
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[44] 2018 DP for 
publishing 
trajectory data.  
Performance 
evaluation of 
the proposed 
mechanism. 
OEM 
Data 
[45] 2013 DP for ITS 
management to 
protect 
Floating Car 
Data 
Used 
Laplacian 
noise with 
smooth 
sensitivity. 
Discussed 
the use of 
event-level 
DP. 
[46] 2017 DP 
mechanisms 
for vehicles 
Discussed 
different 
mechanisms 
of DP. 
CAV 
Functions 
[30] 2018 Discussed 
privacy and 
integrity 
dependency 
for CAVs.  
Discussed 
HD/3D Map 
Update 
scenario and 
DP among 
techniques. 
[47] 2018 Intelligent 
Route 
Planning 
Proposed 
Scalable 
Privacy 
Mechanism.  
[48] 2018 DP for location 
data in 
Crowdsourcing 
applications. 
Conducted 
experiments 
of the 
proposed 
algorithm. 
6.3 Privacy Based on Cryptography 
It has been discussed in the previous section that the 
information of vehicle identity and location are usually 
exchanged in V2V and V2I communications. Threat agents 
can analyse these messages to identify and track vehicles. In 
the literature, group signature based schemes can be used to 
provide unlinkability of the vehicular messages from the 
same owner for different events. These schemes provide 
conditional privacy that only the group manager can access 
the information of real vehicle identities [49]. Pseudonym 
change based schemes are another research area to provide 
unobservability for vehicles.  
 
The challenges with using techniques based on cryptography 
are that the approaches generally introduce high 
computational and communicational overheads [50]. Thus 
there may arise a trade-off between privacy protection and 
safety, and this is considered be one of the open research 
areas [51]. 
 
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) and Homomorphic 
Encryption (HE) are also cryptographic techniques for 
privacy preserving. However, they have not been considered 
in the content of this study due to the following reasons: 1) 
Each party learns the result of some computation in SMC; 
there is no privacy guarantee that none of the parties is 
revealing any sensitive information received from the 
computation result. 2) HE enables computation directly on 
encrypted data;, but introduces high computational overhead 
[52]. 
 
7 Lessons Learned and Open Issues 
The understanding of privacy changes for different people, 
communities and cultures, which should be considered when 
developing privacy mechanisms.  
 
Earlier studies usually considered protecting identity privacy 
and location privacy in ITS by using pseudonym-based and 
group signature-based mechanisms. However, techniques 
based on anonymity fails under the cross-referencing and 
extra background knowledge situations [53].  
 
Although there are limited studied of DP in real-world 
applications, DP has recently emerged as the gold standard of 
data privacy for two reasons [54]. First, DP introduces 
uncertainty for privacy protection is independent of 
background knowledge and computation power. Any further 
data analyses of differentially private results do not reveal 
information. This is the ‘post-processing’ feature of DP. 
Second, DP allows several queries to target the same data, 
known as the ‘composability’ feature [55]. One of the recent, 
local DP studies divided the users into two classes as ‘opt-in’ 
and ‘opt-out’. By analysing the general tendency of a very 
small opt-in group (up to 10% of total users) in a centralised 
DP manner, the overall data utility remain higher than 
previous local DP studies [56]. Recent technological 
developments, such as predictive systems, automation 
systems, and artificial intelligence rely on data that is also 
applicable to CAV functions. By the nature of data, the 
perfect privacy protection can be only achieved by publishing 
no data, which is impossible for many CAV functions. The 
features of ITS, seen in Table 2, are the boundary conditions 
of CAV functions.  Thus, the minimum data utility should be 
rigorously maintained in the privacy mechanism so as not to 
jeopardise the reliability of the service. A further challenge in 
privacy preservation is that privacy can be disclosed if a link 
can be established between different data entries of the same 
data owners. A potential solution for this is publishing data 
with an amount of randomisation (i.e. approximation) rather 
than publishing the exact data [18].  
 
There are also knowledge gaps in DP that should be 
addressed. The ‘privacy budget (𝜖)’ should be set carefully to 
keep the required level of data utility. However, there is not a 
sufficient scientific foundation for this as it strongly depends 
on the dataset. Investigating data flows of the functions 
necessary to be able to assign the appropriate parameters, but 
more research is still needed regarding setting the parameters 
and their implications. DP for location data is an emerging 
research area. There are challenges due to distance-based 
sensitivity calculation [57], and sparsity of location dataset 
leads to adding a large magnitude of noise [58]. 
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The identified privacy challenges with respect to CAV 
functions are summarised in Table 5. Designing DP 
mechanisms can mitigate the privacy risks for the challenges. 
 
Table 5 Summary of identified privacy challenges for the 
CAV functions 
CAV Function Privacy Challenges 
Route Planning Revealing the desired route 
to the infrastructure to be 
able to receive the real-time 
optimal route plan   
Participating in a Vehicle 
Platoon 
Reveal sensitive 
information with either the 
infrastructure or other 
vehicles to be able to 
participate in a right 
platoon 
HD/3D Map Updates The temporal HD/3D Map 
updates should be 
trustworthy without 
revealing the publishers` 
privacy. 
Vehicular Telemetry and 
Biometric Data Collection 
Vehicular telemetric and 
biometric data is highly 
valuable for many parties. 
However, it should not 
reveal real-users privacy. 
 
8 Conclusion 
In this work, we have analysed the complete CAV systems 
regarding the privacy challenges arise from participating in 
ITS and CAV functions. We have also identified the 
approaches might be applied to mitigate such privacy 
challenges. However, it is also recognised that using such 
approaches can introduce a reduction in the efficacy of the 
CAV functions. This work can be supportive for academics 
and industry to investigate the privacy challenges in CAV 
systems, and to extend the research to narrow the knowledge 
gap in the area. It will open the door to design robust privacy-
preserving mechanisms without jeopardising the efficacy of 
CAV functions. 
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